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Abstract
Event coreference is largely ignored in works on coreference as well
as in works on temporal order in discourses, in which temporal rela-
tions between two eventualities e1 and e2 always suppose that e1 6=
e2. However, event coreference is not an uncommon phenomenon. We
show that it is is the keystone on which at least four types of dis-
courses are based: on the one hand, particularizing and generalizing
discourses, which can be viewed as special cases of elaboration and
reformulation discourses respectively, on the other hand causal dis-
courses in which the effect is expressed by means of a causative verb,
which are generally analyzed as explanation or result discourses. De-
scriptions and linguistic analyses of these discourses allow us to present
unusual linguistic phenomena (e.g., coreference between existentially
quantified elements, or assymetrical behavior of explanation or result
discourses). The discourse relations involved are examined. This leads
us to introduce and define new discourse relations . It also sheds a new
light on the discourse relations Explanation and Result.
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1 Introduction
Works on temporal relations between two eventualities e1 and e2 examine
almost exclusively if one eventuality precedes, includes or overlaps with the
other one [MS88, Ash93, Pus95]. All these temporal relations suppose that
e1 6= e2. We will concentrate on cases where e1 = e2, i.e., on event coref-
erence. Event coreference can be seen as a particular case of either event
elaboration or event reformulation, for which it has been acknowledged that
time is not understood as moving [SC91].
Contrary to coreference between objects, coreference between events has
hardly been studied in detail, except for a (pro)nominal phrase referring to
an event as in (1) in which the pronoun this refers to the event described in
the first sentence, see among others [Web88, Ash93].
(1) Ted arrived late. This irritated Mary.
Nevertheless, there is a number of other cases of event coreference since
the description of an event e can be of three types: it is either a sentence, or
a(pro)nominal phrase or an abstraction which is not linguistically realized.
This last case occurs when e is a sub-event of a complex event (cf. infra).
Between two successive descriptions D1 and D2 of the same event e, there
exist therefore 32 = 9 cases of event coreference potentially observable de-
pending on the types of D1 and D2. In this paper, the following cases are
examined:
• In Section 2, event coreference when D1 and D2 are both sentences
(noted as Si) as in (2a) and (2b) is examined.
(2) a. The yugu team won a victory. They beat the tara team yes-
terday.
b. The yugu team beat the tara team yesterday. Therefore, they
won a victory.
In (2a), the two sentences refer to the same event, with more informa-
tion on that event in the second sentence (which ”particularizes” the
first one). In (2b), obtained from (2a) by reversing the order of the
sentences, S2 ”generalizes” S1.
• In Section 3, event coreference when Di (i = 1, 2) is a sentence and
Dj (j = 1, 2, j 6= i) is not syntactically realized is examined. More
precisely, causal discourses in which the effect is expressed by means
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of a causative verb (e.g., crack) are examined, as in (3a) and (3b) ((3b)
is obtained from (3a) by reversing the order of the sentences).
(3) a. Ted cracked the carafe. He hit it against the sink.
b. Ted hit the carafe against the sink. He cracked it.
The causing sub-event of the complex event described by crack is not
linguistically realized, it is just known that it is an act by Ted on the
carafe. However, it is understood as coreferent to the event described
in the cause sentence (Ted hit the carafe against the sink.).
Studying event coreference requires the definition of two types of coref-
erence relation according to the quantity of information conveyed :
Two successive descriptions D1 and D2 of the same entity x (event or
object) are in a particularization relation noted as D2 = PART(D1) iff D2
conveys some new information about x when compared to the information
known from D1.
Two successive descriptions D1 and D2 of the same entity x (event or
object) are in a generalization relation noted as D2 = GEN(D1) iff D2
does not bring any new information about x (and D1 6= D2).
Let us illustrate these two types of coreference with the well-known case
where x is an object. D1 and D2 are then (pro)nominal phrases. In (4a), the
demonstrative NP this New Yorker girl = PART(an actress) since it brings
new information (the actress is a New Yorker girl). In (4b), the pronoun she
= GEN(an actress): a pronoun cannot bring any new information. Finally,
in (4c) the definite or demonstrative NP the / this artist = GEN(an actress)
since artist, hyperonym of actress, does not bring new information.
(4) a. Ted had a drink with an actress. This New Yorker girl irritates
Mary.
b. Ted had a drink with an actress. She irritates Mary.
c. Ted had a drink with an actress. The / This artist irritates Mary.
These two types of coreference relation according to the quantity of in-
formation conveyed do not play a major role in the literature on object
coreference. However, they are essential for event coreference. In the next
sections, it will be shown that (2a) and (3a) involve an event coreference re-
lation of type particularization, (2b) and (3b) an event coreference relation
of type generalization. This difference in the type of coreference explains
assymetrical data. For example, it will be shown that any kind of adjunct
can be inserted in the first sentence of (2a) or (3a), while the insertion of
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adjuncts in the first sentence of (2b) or (3b) is limited. As a consequence,
the causal discourses in (3a) and (3b) are not really converse, despite what
is generally believed. More generally, it will be shown that particularization
and generalization are not symmetrical: the inverse of a generalization re-
lation is a particularization relation, but the inverse of a particularization
relation is not always a generalization relation.
We will show that it is necessary to lay down new discourse relations (the
name of a discourse relation starts with a capital letter): Particularization
(a particular case of Elaboration) for (2a) and Generalization (a particular
case of Reformulation) for (2b). Of course, these new discourse relations are
closely related to the types of event coreference: particularization (abbrevi-
ated as PART) for (2a) and generalization (abbreviated as GEN) for (2b).
Moreover, we will show that these discourse relations are involved in causal
discourses: Particularization for (3a) and Generalization for (3b). We will
question the analysis of (3a) with Explanation and that of (3b) with Result,
and shed a new light on these causal discourse relations. Discourse relations
will be studied in the formal framework of SDRT (Segmented Discourse
Representation Theory, [Ash93, AL95, AP00, ?]1).
2 Event coreference between two sentences
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 provide linguistic descriptions, which are formalized in
Section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines the discourse relations involved.
Notation: The symbol Xri with i = 1 or 2 denotes the predicate or
an argument or modifier in Si with the role r; for an argument r = agent,
patient,... ; for a modifier r = time, location,... ; for the predicate, r is
irrelevant.
2.1 Particularizing discourses
A particularization event coreference relation as defined above is to be found
in “particularizing discourses” (henceforth PDs) such as (2a) or (5).
(5) Fred damaged a garment. He stained a shirt.
In (5), the same event is described in both sentences, with more information
in S2. S2 particularizes S1 since its predicate is a hyponym of the predicate
1We assume that the reader knows SDRT. If it is not the case, she can skip the SDRT
formalizations presented here.
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in S1 (stain < damage) and the (indefinite) object is a hyponym of the (in-
definite) object in S1 (shirt < garment), while its subject is a (pronominal)
anaphora of the subject in S12.
More natural examples of PDs are observed when extralinguistic knowl-
edge is at stake, as in (6). These PDs are based on an extension of hyper-
onymy, namely X compliment Y > X tell Y that Y is pretty in (6a), and X
be sick > X have the flu in (6b). These extended hyperonymy relations rely
on cultural or encyclopedic knowledge.
(6) a. Fred complimented Sue. He told her that she is pretty.
b. Fred is sick. He has the flu.
Our linguistic study is not corpus based. Nevertheless it is easy to find
real examples of PDs, such as (7a) found in [Ash93, p. 1].
(7) a. (. . . ) linguist and philosophers (. . . ) developed a sophisticated
understanding of events and states and the expressions that denote
them. They developed a typology of such entities.
The particularization interpretation of a PD can be explicitly marked,
as in (8) with the cue phrase more precisely.
(8) Fred damaged a garment. More precisely, he stained a shirt.
The PD in (5) or (8) gives rise to an unusual phenomenon: the two
indefinite NPs a garment and a shirt are coreferent. This is unusual since it
is generally admitted [KR93, Cor95] that an indefinite NP has an existential
reading (i.e. introduces a new discourse referent) and that therefore two
indefinite NPs are not coreferent3. This is the case in (9) in which two
garments are involved, whereas only one garment is involved in (5). We will
see in Section 2.4 how to compute the coreference of two indefinite NPs in
PDs.
(9) Fred stained a garment. Joe tore a shirt.
2The two sentences are in the same tense, which is required for event coreference.
3 A few cases exist in which two indefinite NPs are coreferent, (ia) and (ib) taken from
[Cor94].
(i) a. A man arrived. He was a New Yorker.
b. A man, a New Yorker, arrived.
However, the examples presented here with two coreferent indefinite NPs have not been
described in the literature, as far as we know.
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A discourse such as (5) in which at least one element in S2 specifies a
corresponding element in S1 is called a “PD by specification”. Another type
of PD is given in (10). In (10), the modifier during dinner in S2 provides
temporal information about e; the other elements Xr2 in S2 anaphorize or
repeat the corresponding elements Xr1 in S1.
(10) Fred stained a shirt. He stained it during dinner.
A discourse such as (10) in which at least one element Xr2 in S2 has no
corresponding element Xr1 in S1 is called a “PD by adjunction”. Specification
and adjunction may be combined in a single PD. In (11), a shirt specifies a
garment and the time adjunct in S2 has no corresponding element in S1.
(11) Fred stained a garment. He stained a shirt during dinner.
At face value, one gets a PD when each element Xr2 in S2 is either an
(extended) hyponym, an anaphora or a repetition of a corresponding element
Xr1 in S1 or has no corresponding element X
r
1 in S1.
To summarise, in text understanding, it has to be computed that there
is only one garment and one event involved in (5)4. In text generation, it
must be determined under which conditions a PD may be uttered and which
linguistic forms should be produced [Rou00].
2.2 Generalizing restatement discourses
A generalization event coreference relation as defined in Section 1 is to be
found in “generalizing restatement discourses” (henceforth GDs) such as
(12).
(12) a. Fred stained a shirt. Therefore, he damaged a garment.
b. Fred murdered Sue. Therefore, he committed a crime.
While a PD stands mainly at the informational level, a GD stands mainly
at the intentional level: the first sentence in (12a) or (12b) describes what
the speaker wants the hearer to know about an event e, the second one
consists in her restatement of e. By definition, a restatement cannot bring
new information, but it can present an event in a new light, for example, if
the speaker has the intention to forge links with other data, (13).
(13) Fred murdered Sue. Therefore, he committed a crime for which he
risks the death sentence.
4See also [HGA97] for event coreference issues within an information extraction system.
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(12a) is created from (5) by reversing the order of the sentences (and the
anaphoric relations), and by introducing a cue phrase like therefore, with an
epistemic value [RJ96]. S2 generalizes S1 because damage and garment are
respectively hyperonyms of the corresponding elements in S1. In (12b), S2
generalizes S1 because the complex predicate commit a crime is a hyperonym
of murder.
As for PDs, more natural examples of GDs are observed when an ex-
tended notion of hyperonymy is at stake, (14).
(14) a. Fred told Mary that she is pretty. Therefore, he complimented her.
b. Fred has the flu. Therefore, he is sick.
At face value, one gets a GD when each element Xr2 in S2 is an (extended)
hyperonym, an anaphora or a repetition of a corresponding element Xr1 in
S1.
2.3 Formalized conditions
In [Dan01], the conditions to observe a PD or GD have been formalized in
the framework of SDRT, using a notion of implication between two DRSs.
Intuitively, in first approximation, in a PD, S2 “implies” S1. Informally,
staining a shirt “implies” damaging a garment, so Fred stained a shirt “im-
plies” Fred damaged a garment in (5). At the opposite, in a GD, S1 “implies”
S2.
Nevertheless, the situation is more complex: it is indeed the case that
S1 always “implies” S2 in a GD. However, it is not always the case that
S2 “implies” S1 in a PD. There is an assymetry between PDs and GDs.
More precisely, if S1. (therefore) S2. is a GD, then S2. S1. is a PD. But
the converse does not hold, as illustrated in (15). (15a) is a PD. S1 in
(15a) includes a time adjunct (during dinner) which is not repeated in S2,
although it is understood that the staining event occurred during dinner and
that it is the same event as the damaging event. This means that the second
sentence of a PD has to bring new information but has not to repeat all the
information conveyed in the first sentence. On the other hand, the second
sentence of a GD cannot bring new information at all. (15b), is incoherent
(hence the sign #) and cannot be interpreted as a GD.
(15) a. Ted damaged a garment during dinner. He stained a shirt.
b. # Ted stained a shirt. Therefore, he damaged a garment during
dinner.
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Another type of PD examples with no corresponding GD is illustrated
in (16a): (16a) is a PD although the verb in S2 is an hyperonym of the verb
in S1. It has no corresponding GD - (16b) is not a GD. (16a) is paraphrased
by (16c) with the anaphoric form do it.
(16) a. Ted stained a shirt. He damaged the garment during dinner.
b. # Ted damaged a shirt during dinner. Therefore, he stained it.
c. Ted stained a shirt. He did it during dinner.
To put it in a nutshell, the conditions to observe a GD (noted CGD)
are based on a notion of implication between the DRSs which represent the
sentences, while the conditions to observe a PD (noted CPD) are slightly
more complex.
2.4 Discourse relations
It is likely that anyone working on discourse relations would lay down that
the discourse relation between the two sentences of a PD is Elaboration.
However, we are going to show that it is necessary to postulate the exis-
tence of a new discourse relation called ”Particularization” which implies an
event coreference. Beforehand, a terminological remark: ”particularization”
(abbreviated as PART) designates a type of coreference as defined in section
1; ”Particularization” designates a discourse relation between two sentences.
These two notions are linked in SDRT in the following way: if pii is the la-
bel for the DRS Ki representing the sentence Si, then K2 = PART(K1) ⇔
Particularization(pi1, pi2).
Elaboration is given various definitions [Hob79, MT88, AL95], but what-
ever its definition, this discourse relation implies no event coreference rela-
tion. Let us illustrate this point with a ”classic” example of Elaboration,
(17a) or its shorter version, (17b). The first sentence denotes an event e1
which is ”elaborated” in the next sentence(s) which bring(s) new informa-
tion on one or some stages (sub-events) of e1. No event coreference is at
stake: a trip by plane cannot not be reduced to a takeoff and a landing and
even less to a simple takeoff. There exists a number of stages in the trip
which are described neither in (17a) nor in (17b).
(17) a. Nicholas flew from Austin to Paris. He took off at 6 am. He landed
at 2 pm.
b. Nicholas flew from Austin to Paris. He took off at 6 am.
8
Therefore it is necessary to postulate the existence of a discourse relation
(Particularization) which implies an event coreference relation5. Only this
discourse relation allows us to preserve well established insights on discourse
referents. The argumentation is the following: examples such as (5) are
productive counter-examples to the principle of the existential reading of
an indefinite NP (which entails that two indefinite NPs are not coreferent).
Hence, two solutions towards this principle are available:
• Given these productive counter-examples, this principle is abandoned
and an anaphoric reading of indefinite NPs is proposed to allow the
coreference of two indefinite NPs. This solution does not seem sound
since this principle is nearly always true, except in PDs (and in GDs
and in some well known exceptions, see note 2).
• This principle is not abandoned. The two indefinite NPs in (5) are
represented in the standard way: two discourse referents x and y with
the complete conditions garment(x) and shirt(y) are introduced. Yet
the coreference relation x = y is established thanks to the discourse
relation Particularization. This discourse relation implies an event
coreference relation which implies in turn that the arguments with the
same role are coreferent. In other words, it is because the discourse
relation Particularization is established between the two sentences of
(5) that it is known that the two sentences refer to the same event, and
therefore that the two patients a garment and a shirt are coreferent,
i.e., x = y.
This last solution seems better. It raises the following question: how can
it be established that the discourse relation in (5) is Particularization (which
amounts to establishing that (5) is a PD)? The answer to this question lies in
linguistic knowledge: the two sentences in a PD follow some strong linguistic
constraints which have been described in Sections 2.1 and 2.3. This set of
constraints, noted as CPD, allows the computation of the discourse relation
Particularization. In SDRT, the rule is the following (where > is the sym-
bol for the default implication): (τ, pi1, pi2)∧CPD > Particularization(pi1, pi2).
Summary on event coreference between two sentences
It is necessary to postulate the existence of a new discourse relation,
Particularization, which implies an event coreference relation between the
5In the framework of SDRT, the indefeasable consequence of Particularization is written
in the following way: Particularization(pi1, pi2) → Main-event(pi1) =Main-event(pi2).
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event e1 and e2 described in the first and second sentences. It allows the es-
tablishment of an event coreference relation although the events involved are
existentially quantified. This event coreference relation implies the corefer-
ence of participants with the same thematic role, even if they are existentially
quantified. This discourse relation differs from Elaboration for which only
one or some stages (sub-events) of e1 are specified. Nevertheless, Particular-
ization can be seen as a particular case of Elaboration. For exactly the same
reason, a discourse relation Generalization has to be laid down in order to
establish the event co-reference in such examples as (12).
3 Causal discourses
3.1 Linguistic description
Examples (3a) et (3b), repeated in (18a) and (18b), express a ”direct cau-
sation” [Fod70, Sch75]. It is generally admitted that the discourse relation
is Explanation in (18a) and Result in (18b). We adopt this position in this
section before questioning it in the next section.
(18) a. Ted cracked the carafe. He hit it against the sink.
b. Ted hit the carafe against the sink. He cracked it.
In these causal discourses, the effect is expressed by means of a causative
verb, here crack. It is well known (see among other [MS88, Pus91, Pus95])
that a causative verb denotes a complex event which can be broken down
into:
• a causing sub-event, here a non specified6 act by Ted on the carafe
which is represented in the simplified7 DRS pi1: e1–?ACT(t, c) ,
• and a resulting state, here the cracked state of the carafe which is
represented by pi2: e2–cracked(c) .
pi1 and pi2 are grouped in the DRS pi3, which is noted as pi3 = (pi1, pi2).
pi3 can be viewed as the DRS representing the sentence with the causative
verb (Ted cracked the carafe.). The analysis of a clause with a causative
verb is sketched in Figure 1.
6The act by Ted on the carafe is not specified, however it is understood as an act which
affects its patient, i.e., the carafe.
7Our simplified graphic representation of DRS includes conditions (in a compact way)
but not the universe. We leave it to the reader to re-establish the complete DRSs.
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Ted cracked the carafe.
pi1 = e1–?ACT(t, c)
pi2 = e2–cracked(c)
pi3 = (pi1, pi2)
Figure 1: Analysis of a clause with a causative verb
The causal interpretation of discourses such as (18a) or (18b) can be
explained in linguistic terms thanks to the notion of event coreference.
The cause sentence denotes an event which is interpreted as
coreferent to the causing sub-event of the complex event referred
to by the causative verb.
For example, in (18a) or (18b), the hitting event is coreferent to the
causing sub-event of crack, i.e. the non specified act by Ted on the carafe.
Let us underline that the causal interpretation of the discourses we are con-
cerned with is totally bound to event coreference. To emphasize this point,
consider the discourses in (19). Normally they should not be given a causal
interpretation. However, if the hearer imagines that Ted is James Bond
equipped with a special camera, then she may assume a causal interpreta-
tion of (19). In such a case, she assumes an event coreference between the
taking a photo event8 and the causing sub-event of crack.
(19) a. Ted cracked the carafe. He took a photo of it.
b. Ted took a photo of the carafe. He cracked it.
The analysis of (18a) is schematized in Figure 2 with the event coref-
erence relation e1 = e4, where e4 is the hitting event. pi1 introduces an
underspecified predicate ?-ACT. This predicate is specified coreferentially
in pi4 which labels K4, the DRS for the hitting sentence. hit can be con-
sidered as an hyponym of ?-ACT. The event coreference relation e1 = e4 is
therefore of type particularization, i.e. K4 = PART(K1), since K4 brings
new information as compared to K1. Thus, Particularization (pi1, pi4) can
be laid down.
8The taking a photo event is then understood as an act which affects its patient, see
note 6.
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Ted cracked the carafe. He hit it against the sink. Ted hit the carafe against the sink. He cracked it.
pi1 = e1–?ACT(t, c) pi5 = e5–hit(t, c, s)
pi2 = e2–cracked(c) pi6 = e6–?ACT(t, c)
pi3 = (pi1, pi2) pi7 = e7–cracked(c)
pi4 = e4–hit(t, c, s) pi8 = (pi6, pi7)
K4 = PART(K1) ⇔ Particularization(pi1, pi4) K6 = GEN(K5) ⇔ Generalization(pi5, pi6)
with e1 = e4 with e5 = e6
Fig.2 : Analysis of (18a) (preliminary version) Fig.3 : Analysis of (18b) (preliminary version)
The analysis of (18b), similar to that of (18a), is schematized in Figure 3
with the event coreference relation e5 = e69. This coreference relation is of
type generalization, i.e. pi6 = GEN(pi5), since K6 does not bring new infor-
mation compared to K5. K6 can be viewed as an anaphora by hyperonymy
of K5.
The undebatable link between causal interpretation and event corefer-
ence is shared by both Explanation and Result discourses. However these
discourses differ in that Explanation discourses rely on an event coreference
of type particularization, whereas Result discourses rely on a generalization
event coreference. In parallel with the fact that some PDs do not have a
corresponding GD (Section 2.3), some Explanation discourses do not have
a corresponding Result discourse. Let us illustrate this point with the ad-
junction of modifiers in the sentence with a causative verb10. Two types of
adjuncts must be distinguished:
• those with scope over the causing sub-event, for example, temporal ad-
verbs (during dinner). In Ted cracked the carafe during dinner, during
dinner has scope over the the causing sub-event. The information
known on this event is: e1–?ACT (t, c) ∧ during-dinner(e1).
• those without scope over the causing sub-event, for example “quanti-
fier” adverbs (badly). In Ted cracked the carafe badly, badly has scope
over the resulting state but not over the causing sub-event. The in-
formation on the causing sub-event is e1–?ACT (t, c), and that on the
resulting state is e2–cracked(c) ∧ badly(e2).
9The numbering pi5–pi8 is used instead of the standard one pi1–pi4 to refer later to the
DRSs in figures 1 and 2 without ambiguity.
10The claim that Explanation discourses rely on an event coreference of type particular-
ization, whereas Result discourses rely on a generalization event coreference is thoroughly
justified in [Dan00].
12
The adjunction (in the sentence with a causative verb) of a modifier
with scope over the causing sub-event, e.g., temporal adverb, does not alter
the causal interpretation when Explanation is involved, see (20a) with the
adjunction of during dinner in the crack sentence. But it does alter it
when Result is involved, see (20b) which is marked with the sign # to
indicate that no causal interpretation is at stake11. This assymetry can be
explained by a principle on the type of the event coreference relation: it
has to be of type particularization for Explanation, as it is in (20a), see
(21a) which resumes the information known from (20a). It has to be of type
generalization for Result, which is not the case in (20b), see (21b), which
resumes the information known from (20b) and where the generalization
coreference relation is negated, which goes along with the fact that (20b)
has no causal interpretation.
(20) a. Ted cracked the carafe during dinner. He hit it against the sink.
b. # Ted hit the carafe against the sink. He cracked it during dinner.
(21) a. e4–hit(t, c, s) = PART (e1–?ACT (t, c) ∧ during-dinner(e1)) with e1=e4
b. ¬[e6–?ACT (t, c) ∧ during-dinner(e6) = GEN(e5–hit(t, c, s))] with e5=e6
On the other hand, the adjunction of a of a modifier without scope over
the causing sub-event,e.g., “quantifier” adverb, is possible in both Explana-
tion and Result discourses while maintening a causal interpretation, (22).
This goes along with the fact that the coreference relation is of type par-
ticularization in (22a), see (23a), and of type generalization in (22b), see
(23b).
(22) a. Ted cracked the carafe badly. He hit it against the sink.
b. Ted hit the carafe against the sink. He cracked it badly.
(23) a. e4–hit(t, c, s) = PART (e1–?ACT (t, c)) with e1=e4
b. e6–?ACT (t, c) = GEN(e5–hit(t, c, s)) with e5=e6
Let us move to psychological causative verbs (e.g. irritate) whose subject
can refer to an event (This incident irritated Mary) contrarily to causative
verbs which denote a physical change of state (*This incident cracked the
carafe). Two types of discourses are thus available to express Result when
11As shown by the fact that it is impossible to insert a causal connective such as therefore
between the two sentences.
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the change of state is psychological, as illustrated in (24): the subject of
irritate refers to the cause in (24a) and to the agent of the cause in (24b).
Our analysis puts forward that these two discourses, which describe the same
situation but differs in communicative structure, involve both an event coref-
erence relation. This coreference relation is ”classic” in (24a) : (pro)nominal
NP referring to an event. In (24b), it holds between the event referred to
in the cause sentence and the causing sub-event of the causative verb. It
can be considered that (24b) involves a metonymy: he is used instead of his
act. With a psychological verb, Result can therefore be expressed by the
metonymic or full form. With a causative non-psychological verb, only the
metonymic form is available.
(24) a. Ted hit the carafe against the sink. This / This incident irritated
Mary.
b. Ted hit the carafe against the sink. He irritated Mary.
3.2 Discourse relations
We are going to shed a new light on Explanation and Result. It is common
knowledge to state that these discourse relations apply when a causal re-
lation is involved, and when, for Explanation, the description of the effect
precedes that of the cause, while for Result, the inverse discursive linear
order is observed. These discourse relations can thus be established only
when the following axioms (necessary conditions) are verified12:
A1 : Explanation and Result hold between two DRSs, one representing the
cause, the other one the effect.
A2 : It is possible to associate with these two DRSs two distinct syn-
tactic realizations (which are thus linearly ordered); if the syntactic
realization associated with the effect DRS precedes that associated with
the cause DRS, Explanation applies; with the inverse discursive order,
Result applies.
We are going to show that two opposite discourse theories, RST (Rhetor-
ical Structure Theory, [MT88]) and SDRT in its [AP00]) version (noted as
12These axioms are written in SDRT style, however they do not constitute SDRT rules
to infer Explanation or Result. More generally, in this section, the issue is to determine
which discourse relations should be established in discourses such as (18a) or (18b). The
issue is not to compute these discourse relations.
14
SDRT-00), lay down Explanation or Result in such ways that A1 is not ver-
ified for RST while A2 is not verified for SDRT-00. Next we will propose a
solution such that both A1 and A2 are verified.
In RST, discourse relations hold only between two sentences or two
clauses (or between two DRSs representing sentences or clauses in the SDRT
framework). As a consequence, it is said that Explanation holds between
the two sentences of (18a) and Result between the two sentences of (18b).
This amounts to Explanation (pi3, pi4) and Result (pi5, pi8) in the DRSs of
figures 1 and 2. However this analysis is inappropriate: the sentence with
the causative verb refers both to the cause (it indicates who is the agent)
and to the effect. Axiom A1 is thus not verified.
Contrarily to RST, in SDRT-00, discourse relations hold between two
DRSs without any constraint on their possible syntactic realizations. There-
fore, Asher and Pustejovsky can propose to record in the lexical entry of a
causative verb that the DRSs for the causing sub-event and the resulting
state are linked by Result. This amounts to Result(pi1, pi2) and Result(pi6,pi7)
in our examples. However, there is no criterion to choose Result rather than
Explanation: the DRSs of the two sub-events involved are only abstract rep-
resentations without corresponding syntactic realizations. Axiom A2 is thus
not verified. The choice of Result rather than Explanation can be explained
by the fact that Asher and Pustejovsky chose the discourse relation which
follows the chronological order of the events (the cause precedes the effect).
However, it is necessary to maintain a distinction between discursive and
temporal orders. Recall that the discourses (18a) and (18b), with the same
temporal order and different discursive orders, are based either on a partic-
ularization or generalization event coreference, which implies assymetrical
behavior, e.g., for the insertion of adjuncts.
It is thus not justified to link by Result the DRSs for the causing sub-
event and the resulting state of a causative verb. On the other hand, we
propose to link these two DRSs by means of the events they represent: we
propose a conceptual (non discursive) link, noted as CAUSE, between the
events involved, e.g. CAUSE(e1, e2) and CAUSE(e6, e7) in our examples.
This link can be recorded in the lexical entry of a causative verb.
We propose moreover to lay down that the DRSs for the cause sentence
and the resulting state are linked by Explanation or Result, e.g. Explana-
tion (pi2, pi4) and Result (pi5, pi7) in our examples. Let us show that both
axioms A1 and A2 are verified with this solution; the argumentation will
be presented only for Explanation (pi2, pi4), since that for Result (pi5, pi7) is
entirely similar.
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Ted cracked the carafe. He hit it against the sink. Ted hit the carafe against the sink. He cracked it.
pi1 = e1–?ACT(t, c) pi5 = e5–hit(t, c, s)
pi2 = e2–cracked(c) pi6 = e6–?ACT(t, c)
pi3 = (pi1, pi2) with CAUSE(e1, e2) pi7 = e7–cracked(c)
pi4 = e4–hit(t, c, s) pi8 = (pi6, pi7) with CAUSE(e6, e7)
Particularization(pi1, pi4) → e1 = e4 Generalization(pi5, pi6) → e5 = e6
Explanation(pi2, pi4) Result(pi5, pi7)
Fig.4 : Analysis of (18a) Fig.5 : Analysis of (18b)
• For the axiom A1 in Explanation (pi2, pi4), it has to be verified that pi4
represents the cause, and pi2 the effect. This is the case: these DRSs
describe the events e4 and e2 which are linked by the conceptual link
CAUSE thanks to the following implication: CAUSE(e1, e2) ∧ e1 =
e4 ⇒ CAUSE(e4, e2).
Note that a formal basis for A1 can be given, see A1’.
A1’ : Explanation and Result hold between two DRSs which describe
two events linked by CAUSE.
• For the axiom A2 in Explanation (pi2, pi4), it has to be verified that the
syntactic realization associated with the effect DRS, i.e., pi2, precedes
that associated with the cause DRS, i.e., pi4. This is the case: pi2 has
no syntactic realization, however, pi2 is an element of pi3 which does
have a syntactic realization, namely the sentence with the causative
verb. This sentence precedes the syntactic realization of pi4, the cause
sentence. Thereby, by associating with pi2, element of pi3, the syntactic
realization of pi3, A2 is verified for Explanation (pi2, pi4)13.
To sum up, the only way to lay down that (18a) involves Explanation
and (18b) Result while having axioms A1 and A2 both verified consists in
stating that these discourse relations link the DRSs for the cause sentence
and the resulting state. The analyses of (18a) and (18b) which take into
account these facts are sketched in figures 4 and 5.
Summary on causal discourses
13The same kind of argumentation does not work for Result (pi1, pi2) as proposed by
Asher and Pustejovsky, since pi1 et pi2 are both elements of pi3: the only syntactic realiza-
tions that can be associated with pi1 and pi2 are not distinct thus not linearly ordered.
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We have shown that the causal interpretation of discourses such as (18a)
and (18b) is bound to event coreference. Therefore, the discourse rela-
tions Particularization and Generalization are also at stake in causal dis-
courses. What is mere Explanation and Result hold neither between the
two sentences of the causal discourses nor between the two sub-events of the
causative verb. They hold between the DRSs for the cause sentence and the
resulting state. The fact that Explanation goes along with Particulariza-
tion while Result goes along with Generalization allows us to explain why
Explanation discourses have a normal behaviour (e.g. any modifier can be
inserted) while Result discourses have an awkward behaviour (e.g. heavy
constraints on the insertion of modifiers). Explanation and Result are thus
not really converse, despite what is generally believed.
4 Conclusion
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